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CASE COMMENTS
have a working knowledge of the Labor Management Relations Act29
whereas the state courts do not.
It is submitted that Congress should amend section 301(a) so that
the task of formulating federal common law in the field of labor
management relations is entrusted exclusively to the federal courts.
Participation by the state courts can only lead to a disharmony in-
compatible with the Lincoln Mills concept of an all-embracing body
of federal law.
MALCOLM LASSMAN
THE FOOLISH INSURED AND DOUBLE INDEMNITY
Judicial interpretation of the words "accidental" 1 and "accident" '2
in insurance policies has been the subject of extensive litigation.3
However, there is a limited aspect of the subject which is of some im-
portance in its own right: the situation where double indemnity is
sought under an accidental death insurance policy when the insured's
death resulted from his own foolishness.
This particular problem was presented in the recent federal case
from California of New York Life Ins. Co. v. Harrington4 where a
beneficiary under a life policy sought to recover double indemnity for
the death of her husband, who shot himself, by contending that the
deceased relied upon the gun's safety mechanism and that the firing of
the gun was unintended. Prior to the shooting, the insured, knowing
'The Circuit Courts frequently review the National Labor Relations Board's
conclusions of the law. The Board's orders carry no sanctions and if an order is not
complied with, the Board must secure enforcement by filing a petition in the
appropriate federal court of appeals. Similarly, the respondent may file a petition
with the federal court of appeals if it desires to have the Board's order set aside.
Upon such a petition the court is authorized to make a decree setting aside, enforc-
ing, or modifying and enforcing the order as so modified. See, in addition to the pro-
visions of the Act, National Labor Relations Board-Procedures, issued and effective
August 23, 1947; National Labor Relations Board-Rules and Regulations, Series
5, effective August 23, 1947.
"Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 22o N.C. 148, 16 S.E.2d 687 (1941); United
States Fid. &Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 2o5 Okla. 618, 239 P.2d 754 (1951).
'Phelps Dodge Corp. v. De Witt, 63 Ariz, 379, 162 P.2d 605 (1945); Radcliff v.
Southern Aviation School, 209 S.C. 411, 40 S.E.2d 626 (1946).
3Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Roma, 97 Colo. 493, 50 P.2d 1142 (1935); Donohue
v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 259 Ky. 611, 82 S.W.2d 780 (1935); McGinley v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 N.H. io8, 184 At. 593 (1936); Raven Halls v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 254 N.Y.S. 589, 142 Misc. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
'299 F.2d 8o3 (9th Cir. 1962).
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the guri to be loaded, pulled the trigger several times producing
clicking sounds, but the safety prevented discharge. When asked to
stop, the insured ventured to prove the value of the safety by placing
the gun to his head and pulling the trigger. Inadvertently, the safety
was released and the insured was mortally wounded. The sole question
was whether death "resulted directly and independently of all other
causes, from accidental bodily injury."5 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying California law,6 affirmed the
judgment of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff and held that
death was accidental because under the circumstances death was an
unforeseeable and unexpected result.
7
There is a concurrence of opinion that the term "accident" does
not have an exact and technical legal meaning s but rather is defined
in broad statements according to the understanding of the reasonable
man. 9 A generally approved definition, followed by many jurisdic-
tions,'0 was set forth by the Supreme Court in the early case of United
States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry" where an accident was defined as an
occurrence happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not ac-
cording to the usual course of things; or not expected; and that if a
result follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed in a not
unusual or unexpected way, it is not accidental. A modem California
case' 2 adopts a similar definition, characterizing an accident as "a
casualty-something out of the usual course of events, and which hap-
pened suddenly and unexpectedly and without any design of the per-
son injured."' 3
Because of the scope of such definitions, there are conflicting de-
cisions concerning accidental death in insurance policies. 14 In the
11d. at 805.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 307 U.S. 64 (1938).
7299 F.2d at 8o6.
8Lickleider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 184 Iowa 423, z66 N.W. 363
(1918); Goethe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 19o S.E. 451 (1937).
"Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 7 N.Y.2d 222,
196 N.Y.S.2d 678, (1959).
"Allied Mills v. Miller, 9 111. App. 2d 87, 132 N.E.2d 425 (1956); Gaydette v.
Miller, i N.J. Super. 145, 62 A.2d 749 (App. Div. 1948); Warner v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 16 Misc. 2d 6o4, 189 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Campbell v. Jones 73
Wash. 688, 132 Pac. 635 (1913).
31131 U.S. 100 (1889).
12Zukerman v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 42 Cal. 2d 460, 267 P.2d 777 (1954).
23Id. at 784.
"'Compare John Handcock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Plummer, 181 Md. 140, 28
A.2d 856 (1942); and Dorsey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. ioo, 19 S.E.2d 152
(1942), with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 2o4 Ark. 307, 162 S.W.2d 48o (1942);
and Newsoms v. Commercial Cas. Inc. Co., 147 Va. 471, 137 S.E. 456 (1927).
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decision of the principal case, the court has set forth a most liberal view
in accidental death cases by alllowing double recovery to the insured
where death resulted from his foolhardy conduct.' 5 Other jurisdictions,
notably Pennsylvania, 16 North Carolina,17 Tennessee,18 and Georgia, 19
take a contrary position and refuse recovery under similar circum-
stances.
There are three slightly different yet interrelated rationales used
by the courts denying recovery to the insured who is a victim of his
own foolishness. These are assumption of the risk, forseeability of
the risk and presumed intent.
In some cases the courts seem to employ a rationale analogous to
that used in the "assumption of the risk"20 doctine. In the Pennsyl-
vania case of Kinavey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,21 the bene-
ficiary was denied double indemnity where the insured had volun-
tarily and in jest climbed on a bridge railing and fell to his death.
The court held that deceased realized the risk and was warned, yet he
voluntarily placed himself in a position of great danger and by his
conduct was guilty of such recklessness that falling from the bridge
was a reasonably expected result, thereby negating any theory of ac-
cident. Similarly, double indemnity was denied by North Carolina in
Allred v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,22 in which the insured had
voluntarily lain down in the middle of the road to display his brav-
ery, and death ensued as a result of his being run over by an automo-
bile. Here the court held that the risk was so obviously dangerous
as naturally to result in loss of life.
Other courts employ the theory of "foreseeabilify of the risk."
23
In Baker v. National Life & Acc. Co. 24 double indemnity recovery
'5Supra note 7.
1O'Neill v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 345 Pa. 232, 26 A.2d 898 (1942): Zulis-
key v. Prudential Ins. Co., 159 Pa. Super. 363, 48 A.2d 141 (1946).
TAlred v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 247 N.C. io5, 1o S.E.2d 226 (1957);
Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 94 S.E.2d 558 (1956).
I'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Distretti, 159 Tenn. 138, 17 S.W.2d 11 (1929).
"DThompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga. App. 214, 66 S.E.2d
119 (1951); Green v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 67 Ga. App. 520, 21 S.E.2d 465 (1942);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Anglin, 66 Ga. App. 66o, 19 S.E.2d 171 (1942).
OLoynes v. Loring B. Hall Co., 194 Mass. 221, 8o N.E. 472 (1907); MGeary v.
Reed, io5 Ohio App. 111, 151 N.E.2d 789 (1957).m149 Pa. Super. 568, 27 A.2d 286 (1942).
2*247 N.C. 105, 100 S.E.2d 226 (1957).
Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers Ass'n, 186 Iowa 454, 172 N.W. 454
(1919); Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N.C. 713, 51 S.E.2d 295 (1949); Sargent v. Central
Acc. Ins. Co., 112 Wisc. 29, 87 N.W. 796 (1901).
242o Tenn. 247, 298 S.W.2d 715 (x956).
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was refused by Tennessee where insured was shot after he had placed
a can on his head to be used as a target by his companion. The court
stated that death is not caused by accident if it is a natural and fore-
seeable result of a voluntary, though unusual and unnecessary act or
course of conduct of the insured. The doctrine of presumed intent
was used by Georgia in denying recovery in Thompson v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America25 where the insured fatally shot himself while
playing "Russian Roulette." The court said that one engaging in such
a bizarre pastime with a lethal weapon, if he is compos mentis, know-
ing he is courting death, will be held to have intended the obvious
result. That is, an effect which is the natural consequence of an act
or course of action is not an accident; it is either the result of actual
design or it falls under the maxim that every man must be held to have
intended the natural and probable consequence of his deeds.
The court in the principal case seems to disregard the recklessness
of the original act and emphasizes the firing of the gun. Because the
insured relied on past instances in which the gun did not fire, the court
finds it easier to say that the inadvertent release of the safety was un-
foreseeable. 26 When the insured's death is the result of a voluntary act,
in the performance of which there is some misadventure or slip,27 the
death is caused by an accident. This is analogous to the situation
where the insured acted voluntarily but in ignorance of a material
fact.2s This approach is different from that taken by other courts, who
have said that a person who does a needless and dangerous act is
chargeable with knowledge of the obvious and that which is usual or
could be expected.29 And, notwithstanding that the insured was ig-
norant of a material fact, if he "might have known it"30 by the exercise
of ordinary care, by this better view, death cannot be considered the
result of an accident.
The federal court in the principal case made a curious distinction
in interpreting California law applicable to accidental death cases,
for it had previously been held that where the insured had foolishly
provoked an encounter and was killed by the hand of another, double
indemnity recovery would be denied.31 Generally, death resulting
'184 Ga. App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951).
2Supra note 7.
2rPadfic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schlakzug, 143 Tex. 264, 183 S.W.2d 709 (1944);
Jennings v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 226 Mo. App. 777, 46 S.W.2d 226 (1932).
"Horton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 462, 187 Pac. 1070 (1920).
-"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kent, 73 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1934).
31Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga. App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 19,
122 (1951).
at Eraldi v. North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 2o F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Cal. 1937).
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from bodily injuries effected through accidental means, within the
double indemnity provision of a life insurance policy, does not include
the insured's death resulting from wounds received in an encounter
provoked by him or in which he was the aggressor.32 In a leading Cali-
fornia case 33 a similar outcome was reached. The court set forth the
doctrine that, where a person thus invites another to a deadly en-
counter, and does so voluntarily, his death cannot be regarded as ac-
cidental. Quoting from a prior federal circuit court opinion, the
court said, "It might as well be claimed that death is accidental when
a man intentionally throws himself across a railroad track in front of
an approaching train, or leaps from a high precipice, or swallows a
deadly poison." 34 Although these cases are not identical to the princi-
pal case, they seem indistinguishable in legal principle. In both cases
the participants placed themselves in great danger and foolishly as-
sumed hazardous risks. Indeed, it may be said that toying with a load-
ed gun by directing it to one's head and pulling the trigger, under the
objective test of the reasonable man, makes death equally as foresee-
able, if not more so, then entering into a ordinary fight.
In conclusion, it is submitted, that although the line of demarca-
tion as to when foreseeability ends and the unexpected begins is not
a definite one, courts should be hesitant to embark on the line of
reasoning employed by the court in the principal case. Such cases must
be carefully scrutinized by the court; for it is in accordance with human
nature that where double indemnity is provided for in the case of ac-
cidental death, reasons are often sought to justify an accident. There-
fore, under circumstances similar to those in the principal case, the
better rule denies recovery to the double indemnity claimant.35 Fool-
ishness, especially of such a nature as to result in the loss of human life,
should not be the basis for reward.
Pmrx JoHN DAUK
-Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Overby's Adm'x, 251 Ky. 75o , 65 S.W.2d ioo6
(1933); Harrison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 54 Ohio App. 279, 6 N.E.2d 991
(1936); General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Hymes, 77 Okla. 20, 185 Pac. 1085
(1919); Hope v. New York Life Ins. Co., 186 S.C. 85, 195 S.E. 110 (1938); Mutual
Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Ryder, 166 Va. 446 185 S.E. 894 (1936).
-Price v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. 8oo, 147 Pac. 1175 (1915).
"Id. at 1176.
' Trivette v. New York Life Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1966); Baker v.
National Life 8 Acc. Ins. Co., supra note 24, at 716, 717.
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